In 2003, in a speech at the University of South Carolina, President George W. Bush proposed creating a comprehensive free trade area (FTA) between the United and the Middle East (MEFTA) by first negotiating comprehensive free trade agreements with countries in the region bilaterally, and then combining these into a single overarching arrangement between the US and the region as a whole. The Bush Administration has begun to implement this strategy by negotiating FTAs with Morocco, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates. In addition to the earlier agreements that had been signed with Jordan and Israel (and extended to the west Bank and Gaza) this meant that by 2006, the US had six concluded FTA arrangements with countries from the region and a seventh with the UAE was in prospect.
The US interest in MEFTA is not primarily economic. Rather, it reflects geopolitical and security considerations. The MEFTA initiative reflects the judgment that US interests cannot be advanced through purely military or political initiatives. To be effective in the battle for hearts and minds in the region the policy needs an economic component. By contrast, for Arab countries the interest in MEFTA is primarily economic.
For Arab countries, the attraction of Free Trade Agreements with the United States stems primarily from four types of economic advantages they could provide. First, there are the direct benefits that come from increased trade and investment. Free Trade Agreements afford preferential access to the large US market that could result in increased exports and more investment by both foreign and local firms. They will also improve consumer welfare by reducing domestic prices and increasing competition and choice in the domestic market. Second, the agreements can be used to improve trade relations of Middle Eastern Countries vis-a-vis other trading partners. They will reduce the trade diversion that results from other preferential arrangements, such as the EuroMed Agreements with the European Union. They will also enhance the region's bargaining power with other countries that will wish to be accorded treatment similar to that obtained by the United States. Third, the agreements can help to promote increased regional integration. If several countries in the region sign similar agreements, these can also be used as the basis for deepening regional economic integration. The most ambitious hope is that that the US initiative could spur all Arab countries to take these necessary steps vis-a-vis the US and then with each other; a somewhat less ambitious outcome would be for a select group of countries to launch a regional integration that achieves deep economic integration among those countries who are willing. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the agreements can assist with domestic reforms.
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But will these FTA agreements be effective in advancing the goals of those who sign them? Judged by the history of FTAs in the region, some skepticism is probably in order since many have not lived up to expectations.
3 Middle Eastern countries have often grasped the symbols of Arab unity but been unwilling to engage in the fundamental systemic changes that would really make their markets mutually contestable. Foot draggers have also been able to stall meaningful agreements or taken steps that deny full implementation. In addition, there are also questions about size of the benefits such agreements might produce because most Arab countries have relatively modest trade and investment links with the United States; the European Union is by far a more important trading partner. In 2003 for example, EU imports and exports from Arab countries were 2 See for example Galal and Lawrence 2005. 3 For an excellent review of Arab regional efforts see Fawzy (2003) .
4.6 and 3.7 times larger than those from the US respectively while the non-oil exports to the US amount to around 6 percent of all exports from Arab countries and the US accounted for only 8 percent of these country's imports. The deep character of these agreements reflects the fact that while the Middle East has been given unique political priority, the US is also negotiating similar agreements based on a standard template with other countries in many parts of the world. the type of agreement the US congress will support and partly because it does not want to set a precedent of departing from the framework that other countries can point to.
By contrast, with the exception of the GCC, most previous agreements signed by Arab countries both with the European Union and among each other, have generally dealt only with border barriers such as tariffs and quotas and, even with respect to these, coverage has often been incomplete. While the countries in the region have made some progress in reducing tariffs, particularly on regional trade, they have failed, therefore, to deal effectively with non-tariff barriers and the liberalization of services and investment.
The pan-Arab, Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA) for example, covers only trade in goods and remains deficient with respect to rules of origin and implementation.
The sub-regional Agadir Agreement (between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia) has corrected the rules of origin issue for four countries. 8 . But Agadir deals only with trade in goods.
I will argue in this paper that the deep nature of the US agreements presents new opportunities for Arab countries. But to take full advantage, they will have to complement the agreements with additional policy measures, both individually, and together. The promise of the agreements comes from the ability to use them as a catalyst for increased economic benefits by improving regulatory rules and systems at home and facilitating integration with the rest of the region and the world. But the agreements are not panaceas. They also present problems for Arab countries, first in relating these US agreements to agreements with other trading partners -most importantly the EU, second in creating political difficulties associated with closer relations with the USA given problems in the region, and third, in undertaking the necessary economic and political adjustments necessary to realize the benefits.
In what follows I will explore these issues in greater detail. I will first present some evidence on the need for MEFTA-type agreements by Arab Countries. I will then consider whether the particular approach the US is using is likely to result in an overarching agreement. The current regulatory regimes in many Arab countries impede private sector entrepreneurship, but they have persisted because they also generate benefits for those who skilled in operating within the system and those people that the system empowers to grant benefits. Altering these regulatory regimes will create new winners and losers, and therefore has important political implications.
There is lots of evidence that the regulatory system has impeded international trade. A large number of studies suggest that judged by international norms, the countries in the region trade considerably less with each other, with the United States and 10 See Kaufmann et. al. (2005) . 11 See Dasgupta et. al (2002) .
with the rest of the world than would be expected. 12 In addition, particularly in the Gulf countries, foreign direct investment is unusually low. Part of the explanation for this weak performance is trade and regulatory policies. Once non-tariff barriers are taken into account, on average trade protection in the region is higher than any other region in the world.
In addition to indicating considerable scope for improving regulatory policies in Arab countries, the governance measures highlight two challenges for MEFTA. First, there are major differences among Arab countries with respect to regulatory quality and administrative efficiency. The countries with whom the US has already signed are those with the highest regulatory quality, suggesting that the US has followed its announced intention to sign agreements with "countries that demonstrate a commitment to openness and reform." will have to accelerate dramatically, or major political reforms should not be made a precondition for membership.
Will a bottom up Approach work?
The MEFTA approach is bottom up. The US aims to first negotiating bilateral agreements, then link them in sub-regional agreements and only at the end of the process will construct a single MEFTA. There is clearly a trade off between mega-regional initiatives that are built bottom up and those that are constructed collectively in a single agreement with all participants simultaneously. The top-down approach has the virtue of allowing for a set of rules that is approved by all and under which all parties operate. But obtaining agreement can be difficult in a collective negotiation with many participants because foot-draggers can stall the process or water-down agreements that are actually concluded. Indeed the recent history of efforts such as Free Trade in the Americas (FTAA) and APEC point to the problems in this approach. By contrast, the bottom-up approach permits those most willing and able to move first. It also allows them tailor the details of their agreements to particular bilateral circumstances. The advantage of the MEFTA, therefore, is that it has allowed for the conclusion of deep and far-reaching agreements that almost certainly could not have been negotiated with universal Arab participation. But the cost of the approach is that it creates a number of overlapping trade regimes that present problems for eventual integration.
Even though the US has followed a boiler plate approach to the agreements, there are still important differences among them, mainly because the US blueprint has evolved over time. The US MEFTA initiative also presents signatories with problems of administering different systems of rules in their trade with the US, the EU, their regional partners and the rest of world. In addition, the bottom-up approach prevents the Arab countries from initially forming coalitions, compelling them to bargain individually with the United States. The consequence will be initial agreements that are less reflective of their collective interests.
At later stages, however, as an overarching MEFTA begins to emerge they should find it easier to coordinate their positions. Nonetheless, while the approach that has been selected is possibly less likely to guarantee that eventually a single MEFTA will emerge, it is more likely to ensure that the agreements that do emerge are likely to retain their deep character.
The MEFTA has the goal of encouraging regional integration, yet, in contrast to the EU, the willingness of the US to negotiate individually with GCC countries has created tensions for the operation of the common external tariff of its customs union. On the other hand, this has created a mechanism for those Gulf States that are most interested in economic reforms to place competitive pressures on those who are more reluctant to do so.
More recent developments have raised some questions about whether the US will actually be able to sustain the initiative to bring it to completion. 14 When Dubai Ports
World acquired the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, it obtained control over facilities at six US ports. The officials who sit on the US government interagency committee responsible for reviewing foreign acquisitions for possible threats to national security, (CFIUS), viewed the sale as routine and approved it in November 2005. However, the case became highly controversial when stirred up by a company with financial interests in the deal's failure and opposition mounted in the US Congress. The acquisition was painted in a highly negative light not only by the President's opponents who seized on the chance to be tougher than he was on a national defense issue but by many in his party. Eventually the Dubai Ports World Corporation responded to the controversy by selling the US port facilities to a US-controlled firm.
The entire affair marked a sea-change in the politicization of a process for reviewing Foreign Direct Investment that had previously been routine and technical. It revealed problems with the CFIUS process in general that may require reform. 15 It also demonstrated how public fears can make it difficult to distinguish between America's 14 For a more complete discussion see Graham and Marchick (2006) . 15 See Graham and Marchick (2006) Chapter 6 for a discussion of possible reforms.
Arab allies and genuine threats to its national security. This treatment certainly makes it more difficult for Arab countries to view the investment provisions of Free Trade
Agreements as a genuine two-way street. The incident occurred at the same time as the US and the United Arab Emirates (which includes Dubai) were negotiating a Free Trade Agreement, and it was not surprising that in the immediate aftermath of the affair, the talks were temporarily postponed. 16 On March 10, the USTR announced that the fifth round of FTA talks between the U.S. and UAE, which were scheduled to begin on March 13 in Abu Dhabi, would be postponed. 17 The Congress can be counted on to interpret a vote on a bilateral FTA as a referendum its more general views of that country. This has made certain bilateral FTAs especially contentious. The NAFTA debate for example, introduced all kinds of issues relating to Mexico many of which were not directly linked with trade. Likewise the vote on CAFTA in 2005 generated controversies relating to human and labor rights and passed by a mere 217 for and 213 against in the House of Representatives. 18 Labor rights issues were another source of opposition. The EU already has "Euro-Med" bilateral FTAs with most Arab countries outside the GCC. The EU has also developed a system for Pan-European rules of origin that permits diagonal cumulation among regional members with an FTA (like Agadir) that uses European rules of origin. The Euro-med agreements are part of Association Agreements that cover a far broader range of non-economic issues than the US agreements, but their trade provisions are more limited: they fail to include services and investment and have serious limitations with respect to agriculture. However, the EU is now moving to second phase in which willing partners will be invited to sign pluri-lateral agreements that cover services and investment. The EU is also negotiating individualized work programs (Partnership Agreements) with each Middle Eastern country that will support reforms in areas mutually considered to be priorities. 19 Countries are also being encouraged to adopt European standards and norms in addition to EU rules of origin.
An important issue is whether, in contrast to its earlier initiatives, the recent EU approach will be an effective anchor for reforms. 20 The fairly standardized nature of the US -FTAs allows reformers to argue that the entire package must be adopted. The requirements for full EU membership were perhaps even a more powerful anchor in the case of the countries that have recently acceded. But the ala-cart approach in the EU Neighborhood Policy may make it easier for countries to avoid reforms that are politically difficult.
The US and the EU share the broad goal of trying to promote economic development in the Middle East and encourage political and social reforms. And in many respects their initiatives are complementary. But there could also be serious problems.
For example, if Arab countries use EU rules of origin in their regional arrangements, how could they become eligible for diagonal cumulation under US rules? Would the US recognize EU rules? Unlikely. Would Arab countries be expected to implement two differently sets of rules in the preferential agreements they sign among themselves?
Similarly, would the standards they are required to use by the US agreement be compatible with those required by the EU? These tensions with the EU are particularly relevant because Arab countries typically have three or four times as much trade with the EU than they do with the US and if forced to chose, Arab countries would probably follow EU rules, thereby limiting the potential regional impact of a US agreement.
19 For a more complete discussion see Hoekman (2005) 20 For an excellent analysis of the earlier agreements see Tovias and Ugur (2004) . Improvements in the operation of customs, the transparency of policy, procedures used for government procurement, the laws for intellectual property and other regulatory practices such as standards based on science will change the system not only for US trade and investment but for all foreign and domestic firms who trade in these countries.
What Economic Impacts
Opening services trade to foreign investors will heighten competition, which could generate important improvements in productivity. These key potential benefits from US agreements are by their very nature difficult to measure. But there are reasons to believe they could be considerable, provided the appropriate complementary domestic policy steps are taken. But these benefits will require domestic leadership that takes advantage of the opportunities that are created. In this respect, however, the deep nature of the US agreements is a great advantage.
Most of these benefits could be achieved by countries that individually sign deep bilateral FTA and complement them by domestic reforms. If such reforms and liberalization are achieved by some Arab countries individually, their neighbors will automatically benefit from their more open regimes even absent formal regional arrangements and with the United States. Thus as long as individual countries implement these agreements the overall initiative seems worthwhile even if the difficulties of eventually consolidation are considerable.
An important concern in Arab countries relates to the inclusion of issues such as labor and environment in these agreements. In these areas, however, the specifics of the agreements need to be examined carefully. The agreements do not require adherence to specific environmental and labor standards. 22 Instead, the countries commit in general terms to promote workers rights and protect the environment and the agreements emphasize the enforcement of domestic environmental and labor laws and not weakening environmental laws or reducing domestic labor protections in order to encourage trade or investment.
Moreover when it comes to enforcement, the agreements stress that "the parties retain the right to make decisions regarding the allocation of resources to enforcement with respect to labor (or environmental) matters determined to have higher priorities. To be sure, these obligations are backed by the Agreements' dispute settlement procedures and cases can be brought where enforcement failures affect trade. However, if one party is found guilty of such infractions, and fails to come into compliance, the other side may not be entitled to retaliate using trade protection. If either country is found by a panel to be in violation of its enforcement obligations it can be subject to a monetary assessment.
Moreover, such an assessment cannot exceed $15 million and the funds are not necessarily paid to other party but may instead be used to help improve compliance. In sum, concerns that these provisions could be used to deny countries benefits are likely to be exaggerated.
Recommendations: By itself, under current conditions the impacts of most individual agreements and even an overarching MEFTA are likely to be modest for three 22 The Moroccan agreement, for example states that the Parties "shall strive to ensure" that its labor laws are enforced and consistent with the right of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition on forced labor, a minimum age of employment, and acceptable work conditions. reasons. First, the current trade and investment links between the United States and the Middle East are relatively weak. Second, the regulatory and business environments in many Arab countries continue to impede the global integration of these economies. And third, the negative political fallout from US intervention in Iraq and the friction between
Israel and its neighbors far outweighs the political benefits the US could obtain from the initiative. Nonetheless, the MEFTA initiative provides both the US and its Arab partners with opportunities to take additional measures that could yield much greater benefits.
While trade agreements provide opportunities; they do not guarantee results. They can contribute to positive economic and political outcomes but need to be accompanied by other policies and actions by the private sector.
United States. For the United States, the principle challenges are sustaining the initiative politically; keeping the focus of the initiative on trade and investment issues;
improving some of the specific rules of the agreement; introducing mechanisms that will facilitate integration among its Middle Eastern partners; and achieving a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Paradoxically, the United States will reap greater political benefits if, to a greater degree than it has done so far, it keeps MEFTA on a strictly economic track. MEFTA should be focused on maximizing the economic benefits it can bring to Arab countries.
The criteria for MEFTA membership should be the capacity to implement and benefit from the agreement. The use of MEFTA as a bargaining chip to induce internal political reforms and changes in other policies, however well intentioned, is likely to backfire. This is likely to be difficult though in an environment in which Democrats who oppose trade agreement, are especially likely to bring political considerations into the debate.
Particularly in the more recent agreements, the US has appropriately insisted on Free Trade Agreements that achieve much deeper integration than the WTO requires of its members. This approach entails liberalization of all merchandise trade including agriculture, services (with exceptions) and foreign direct investment, and credible dispute settlement provisions. The depth of the MEFTA agreements ensures that the agreements are not merely symbolic; it also promotes their use as an anchor for domestic reforms.
The agreements should not be watered down in an effort to attract more reluctant members. It is better to have comprehensive bilateral and sub-regional agreements, than weaker agreements to which all countries subscribe.
However improvements could be made with respect to the more protectionist provisions of the agreements relating to restrictive rules of origin and excessive intellectual property protection. The US should not be imposing intellectual property rules that cannot be justified as measures to stimulate innovation in Arab countries and can only be justified as measures to maximize the income of US pharmaceutical and other companies. MEFTA has recently run into security concerns that have been provoked by the Dubai Ports affair. The agreements need clearer national security exception provisions that prevent opponents using national security as a pretext for rejecting the agreements.
Since the number of agreements has now reached a critical mass, more attention also needs to be paid by the US as to how they can be integrated. In particular, a mechanism for diagonal cumulation needs to be developed to allow value-added in any of the countries to be combined to meet rules of origin requirements. Ideally this would be done on the basis of the relatively straight forward the rules of US-Israel agreement. The US should also work with the EU to craft common rules of origin or mutual recognition of each others rules. Consideration should also be given to developing regional, rather than bilateral dispute settlement mechanisms.
Given its political objectives, the US should make a separate FTA agreement with Palestine a high priority. The current coverage of the West Bank and Gaza under the USIsrael FTA is inadequate and does not meet Palestinian needs for increased international engagement and domestic institutional reforms. In particularly, the failure to cover investment is a serious gap. To be sure, the US currently faces difficulties in dealing with the Hamas administration, but eventually a US-Palestine FTA is a key building block for a MEFTA that lives up to its potential.
Finally, a comprehensive MEFTA arrangement is unlikely absent an acceptable settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US is unlikely to sign a comprehensive agreement with the region that does not include Israel. It is difficult, however, to imagine several Arab countries agreeing to a comprehensive arrangement that does include Israel
The political interest that the US has in the region provides unique opportunities for those seeking to use agreements as a stimulus to reform. But from the region's standpoint, it should also be acknowledged that the political nature of the US interest creates problems as well as opportunities. It is not easy to adopt policies for domestic economic reform and increased international integration in the first place. Whatever the long run payoff may be, reforms and trade liberalization create losers as well as winners. In this context, it is only too easy for opponents to wrap their opposition in nationalist and religious flags.
The debate over free trade is becomes particularly difficult and charged when it is conflated with the debate over relations with the US and/or Israel. Simply signing MEFTA is insufficient. To exploit its potential, domestic based firms need to be competitive. Private firms need to change their corporate strategies to confront competitors both at home and in the United States. Governments too, need to adapt their policies to encourage domestic and foreign investors to take advantage of the improved access to the US market.
The fact that several countries in the region are willing to make the extensive commitments required by US FTAs suggests that there is scope for deeper integration agreements in the region based on the provisions. GAFTA and Agadir for example are limited to trade in goods. MEFTA breaks new ground for many countries by including extensive obligations in services, foreign investment, standards, and dispute settlement.
agreements should also be used as a means of developing regional integrative institutions.
Countries that have signed agreements with the US independently need to think about coordinating their negotiating strategies with respect to how these agreements can now be linked. Strategies for achieving diagonal cumulation and perhaps broader participation in dispute settlement are examples.
The agreements should be used as a basis for negotiating other bilateral and plurilateral agreements with trading partners outside the region. By signing an agreement with the United States, countries indicate a more general commitment to deeper, comprehensive international integration. Any country willing to adjust to free trade and investment with the largest developed economy could surely make similar adjustments in its trade and investment with other countries.
Countries that have not yet joined need to weigh their options carefully. Some countries in the region are not yet at a stage where they can assume the kinds of obligations required by these FTA and some might decide the costs of doing so are greater than the benefits. But, inevitably the laggards will experience pressures to enhance their reforms to match those in neighboring countries.
The US approach is standardized. Once they are eligible the US gives countries a take it or leave it choice. This means they need to understand the fine print of the agreement. The agreements have not been crafted to exploit individual country weaknesses but it does mean that countries need to do their homework and understand the full nature of the obligations they are assuming. Trade expertise is essential.
In sum, while the agreements create enhanced opportunities for economic benefits, at the end of the day, the payoffs to these agreements are highly contingent on governments and the private sector taking other measures.
